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31.
An empirical test of trust-building processes and outcomes in sales manager-salesperson relationships 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Thomas G. Brashear James S. Boles Danny N. Bellenger Charles M. Brooks 《Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science》2003,31(2):189-200
This study examines three trust-building processes and outcomes in sales manager-salesperson relationships. This study, based
on a sample of more than 400 business-to-business salespeoples from a variety of industries, shows two trust-building processes
(predictive and identification) to be significantly related to salesperson trust in the sales manager. Interpersonal trust
was found to be most strongly related to shared values and respect. Trust was directly related to job satisfaction and relationalism,
and indirectly related to organizational commitment and turnover intention.
Thomas G. Brashear (brashear@mktg.umass.edu) (Ph.D., Georgia State University) is an assistant professor of marketing in the Isenberg School
of Management at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst.
James S. Boles (jboles@gsu.edu) (Ph.D., Louisiana State University) is an associate professor of marketing in the Robinson College of Business
at Georgia State University. His research has appeared in a variety of journals, including theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Business Research, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theJournal of Retailing, theJournal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, and theJournal of Applied Psychology. His areas of research interest include personal selling, sales management, key and strategic account management, and business
relationships.
Danny N. Bellenger (mktdnb@langate.gsu.edu) (Ph.D., University of Alabama) is currently chairman of the Marketing Department in the Robinson
College of Business at Georgia State University. His research has appeared in a number of academic journals including theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Advertising Research, theCalifornia Management Review, theJournal of Retailing, theJournal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, Industrial Marketing Management, and theJournal of Business Research. He has authored four monographs and four textbooks on marketing research, sales, and retailing.
Charles M. Brooks (brooks@quinnipiac.edu) (Ph.D., Georgia State University) is an associate professor and chair of the Department of Marketing
and Advertising at Quinnipiac University. His research has appeared in theJournal of Business Research, theJournal of Retailing, Marketing Theory, and theJournal of Marketing Theory and Practice. 相似文献
32.
We study market equilibration in laboratory economies that are larger and more complex than any that have been studied experimentally to date. Complexity is derived from the fact that the economies are “international” in economic structure with multiple input, output, and foreign exchange markets in operation. The economies have twenty-one markets and due to the fact that they have roughly fifty agents, the economies are characterized by several hundred equations. In spite of the complexity and interdependence of the economy, the results demonstrate the substantial power of the general equilibrium model of perfect competition to predict the direction of movement of market-level variables. Empirical patterns in the convergence process are explored and described. 相似文献
33.
This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of difficulty is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier.JEL classifications: Q5, H4, D7, D8An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Risk and Uncertainty in Environmental and Resource Economics, Wageningen, The Netherlands, June 2002. 相似文献
34.
Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma.
In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to
reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge
sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties.
We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also
punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease
the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly
lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation.
We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University
of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson,
Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful
comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available
from the authors. 相似文献
35.
Charles C. Okeahalam 《International Review of Applied Economics》2007,21(5):669-685
Indicators of market power can be ambiguous because cost economies associated with scale and not market imperfections may influence results. This article illustrates that without direct measures of concentration, estimates of costs, scale economies and profitability can be used to identify market power in banking. Secondly, via this method, econometric estimates provide meaningful evidence of market power in the South African banking sector over the study sample period (1979–1998). A reasonable conclusion is that while industrial structure is important, careful consideration needs to be given to cost economies and profitability when assessing market power. In addition, there is a need to consider appropriate policy to reduce market power in banking in South Africa. 相似文献
36.
Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain
about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation
(CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical
nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental
evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components
that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private
good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a
probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the
winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in
the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion
of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness
of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect
on the winning bid.
相似文献
37.
Charles J. Corbett Frank J. C. Debets Luk N. Van Wassenhove 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1996,7(3):287-305
Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable. 相似文献
38.
Summary This paper characterizes the optimal policy for a model in which manager may adopt an endogenous number of projects but has only limited resources to devote to their evaluation and maintenance. In any period, the manager may discard any subset of existing projects but may evaluate only one existing or one new project which is then either discarded or restored. Both its current return and the probability with which a project may be restored depends only on the number of periods since its last evaluated. For a manager whose objective is to maximize the sum of discounted returns, the optimal policy takes one of two forms. A discard policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project in each period and discard current projects at some critical age. An age inspection policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project only if all current projects are sufficiently young.Support from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics and the Research Resource Committee of the Rutgers Graduate School of Management is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Roy Radner for valuable assistance in the early stages of the work. 相似文献
39.
A bstract In his 1915 essay "The Opportunity of Japan," Thorstein Veblen theorized that traditionai Japanese institutions would undergo evolutionary change as Japan exploited borrowed industrial technology and became integrated into the global business enterprise system. This article explains the recent liberalization of Japanese financial markets which followed Japan's rise to economic prominence within the context of Veblen's theory of institutional development of the enterprise system. The Japanese process of financial deregulation is reviewed, Veblen's predictions Japan are presented and an explanation provided for the liberalization of Japanese financial markets . 相似文献
40.
Hsu JI 《Hospital materiel management quarterly》1990,12(1):69-75
Over the past ten years there has been a considerable increase in application of theoretically correct measurement methods in determining the economic life of equipment. Approximately 89% of the firms surveyed have equipment replacement policies. The discounted rate of return method is the most widely used in determining the service life of equipment; the MAPI formula is not widely used. Difficulties in applying a replacement policy can be classified into three groups: operational, organizational, and economic. The problems mentioned most often are operational. In organizational difficulties there is usually a lack of coordination between staff and line managers. Economic problems are generally the limited funds available for equipment replacement. Formal educational programs are lacking for the development of equipment replacement managers. For the firms having replacement policies, individuals with engineering degrees are preferred over those in other disciplines for the management of the equipment replacement policy. 相似文献